The sensitivity to risk that most people (hence, financial operators) feel affects the dynamics of financial transactions. Here we present an approach to this problem based on a current generalization of Boltzmann-Gibbs statistical mechanics.
(lose). This sensitivity to risk is also observed in animals such as rats, birds and honeybees [2] when they are exposed to variable food sources with different statistical properties, such as mean or variance, of the offered quantity of food.
The usual preference for a sure choice over an alternative of equally or even more favorable expected value is called risk aversion. Actually, most people present the tendency to feel aversion to risk when they expect to gain with moderate or high probability, and attraction to risk when they expect to lose. However, these tendencies are inverted for very low probabilities [3] .
Naturally, this pattern of attitudes affects most human decisions since chance factors are always present, e.g., in medical strategies, in gambling or in financial transactions. In particular, in the context of finances, the attitude of economic operators under risky choices clearly is one of the main ingredients to be kept in mind for realistically modeling market dynamics.
In the present text, we want to discuss the sensitivity to risk within the context of nonextensive statistical mechanics [4, 5] . In order to do so we apply methods of statistical physics, a strategy that has proved to be very useful in several previous works [6] (see also [7] for general discussions on the application of statistical physics methods in economics).
The nonextensive formalism was introduced over a decade ago by one of us [4] and further developed [5] , with the aim of extending the domain of applicability of statistical mechanics procedures to systems where Boltzmann-Gibbs (BG) standard formalism presents serious mathematical difficulties or just fails. Indeed, there is an increasing number of systems for which the standard mathematical expressions of BG statistics appear to be inappropriate.
Some of these cases can be satisfactorily treated within the new, nonextensive formalism.
Therefore, a considerable amount of applications in many fields have been advanced in the literature [8] . The wide range of applications probably is deeply related to the ubiquity of fractal structures, power-laws, self-organized criticality in nature.
The nonextensive statistics is based on the following entropic form
where W is the total number of microscopic configurations i with probability p i . This expression recovers, in the limit q → 1, the usual Boltzmann-Gibbs-Shannon entropic form
Within the nonextensive formalism, suitable expectation values of a given quantity A are calculated as normalized q-expectation values, defined through
where A i is the value that the observable A adopts in configuration i.
Coming back to economics, traditionally, the analysis of decision making under risk was treated through the "expected utility theory" (EUT) [9] , on the assumption that individuals make rational choices. More precisely, the expected value E, corresponding to the prospect P ≡ (x 1 , p 1 ; . . . ; x n , p n ) such that the outcome x i (gain if positive; loss if negative) occurs with probability p i , is given by problems, by Kahneman and Tversky [3] . They then proposed a generalization to EUT equation within "prospect theory" (PT) [3] :
, where the weighting function Π(p i ) monotonically increases with p i .
More recently, PT was generalized [12] using a rank dependent or cumulative representation where the "decision weight" multiplying the value of each outcome is distinguished from the probability weight. This interesting generalization is however irrelevant for the present discussion, where we will deal with simple prospects with a single positive outcome in which case both versions coincide.
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The typical shape (corresponding to the most frequent human attitude) of the weight Π(p i ) basically is, as sketched by Tversky and collaborators [3, 10] on the ground of experiments and observations, an increasing function, concave for low and convex for high probabilities, with Π(0) = 0, Π(1) = 1 and Π(p * ) = p * , for some p * typically verifying 0 < p * < 1/2. The following functional forms have been proposed [4, 8] in the context of nonextensive statistical mechanics:
usually referred to as escort probability. Other functional forms are also available in the literature [11] , such as
A > 0. Clearly, A = 1 recovers the escort probability. In all these cases, each individual can be characterized by a set of parameters which yields a particular Π(p) representing the subjective processing that a given individual makes of known probabilities p in a chance game.
In the regime of moderate and high probabilities, human behavior can be satisfactorily described by the weighting function Π(p) = p q . This expression, which has a simpler form than other weights describing the full domain, is the one that we will adopt throughout the present text.
Let us illustrate, through a simple example, the kind of choice problems we are referring to. The proponent of a transaction typically asks: "What do you prefer: to receive with certainty $ 85,000 or to play a game where you receive $100,000 with probability 0.85 and nothing with probability 0.15?". The game occurs only once. In this case most people choose to take the money.
Clearly, the present games are not the kind of operations that actually occur in a financial market. However in the sense of the theory of financial decisions, they paradigmatically illustrate the risk aversion phenomenon.
One can think in terms of normalized q-expectation values as follows gain/take the money 1 = 85, 000
and gain/play the game q = 100, 000 × 0.85
Notice that the standard expectation value of the game is also $ 85,000; this corresponds to an ideally rational player, i.e., q = 1. Since most people prefer to take the money, this means that most people have q < 1 for this particular decision game. For the loss problem, an analogous reasoning leads to q < 1 also, therefore unifying both situations. Now, how can we measure the value of q that characterizes the attitude of an individual in connection with a particular game? The person is asked to choose between having the quantity X in hands or playing the game of receiving Y =$100,000 with probability P = 0.85 and nothing with probability 0.15. Then we keep changing (typically decreasing) the value of X and asking again until the person changes his(her) mind at a certain value X c . Then, the value of q associated with that person, for that problem, is given by the equality
In particular if the threshold value is 85, 000, this means that the individual acts rationally, with q = 1.
If unnormalized q-expectation values were considered instead of (3), i.e., if
it is easy to show that most individuals act with q > 1.
In a recent work [13] we investigated the consequences of risk averse attitudes in the dynamics of economic operations. We introduced an automaton simulating monetary transactions among operators with different attitudes under risky choices. Elementary operations were of the standard type used in hypothetical choice problems that exhibit risk aversion [3] , that is, of the type illustrated above. By following the time evolution of the asset position of the operators, it is possible to conclude on the consequences of each particular attitude.
We concentrated on problems where moderate or high probabilities are involved.
We considered different cases: in A (alter-referential), the proponent operator somehow knows the psychology of the other (characterized by q ′ ); in S (self-referential), the proponent ignores q ′ and attributes to the other operator his/her own value of q; finally, in C (consensual), the two operators act by consensus. Different restriction rules on the level of indebtedness of the operators were also considered in the model.
One observes that the type of conditions limiting indebtedness are critical for defining the nature of the long term evolution, i.e., existence or not of a nontrivial steady state. If individuals become permanently forbidden to trade from the instant their assets become less than a minimal quantity M * (restrictions of type PR, standing for permanent restraints)
then the assets evolve to a trivial steady state where there is concentration of wealth around the more rational player (a Dirac δ-function centered at q = 1 or at the boundary closer to q = 1). This result is independent of the initial distribution of q.
We also considered opportunistic indebtment restraints (type OR, standing for opportunistic restraints) where agents can operate indefinitely except that they do not pay when they would have to do so if at a given step of the dynamics their assets become less the minimal quantity M * (i.e., operators can become swindlers occasionally). In this case the system evolves to a nontrivial steady state. The details of this steady state depend, among other factors, on the distribution of the parameter q of the operators. In Fig. 1 (a) , we exhibit the average amount of money of the operatorsM (q, t) as a function of their q for different time instants (the average is taken over a large number of realizations (histories)
). The initial distribution of q was a uniform distribution in [0, 4] since about 75% of the people are risk-averse when high probabilities are involved (in the simulations we considered unnormalized expected values, therefore most individuals act with q > 1). The maximum of the distribution depends on the hypothesis made on the value of q of the partner. For a hypothesis of type A, the rational player wins, for type S there are maxima on both sides of q = 1 (the absolute one being for q > 1, i.e, agents who are conservative for gains). For the consensus case C, the maximum asset occurs for q > 1 (for more details see Ref.
[13])
Interestingly enough, some level of tolerance with regard to those who owe money avoids extreme wealth inequality to become the stationary state. However, one must keep in mind that in our simulations the distribution of q is kept fixed along the dynamics and, therefore, the psychological effect of asset position is not being taken into account in the present model.
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The inclusion of such ingredient in the dynamics would provide an improved, more realistic model. vs. t and (c) q max vs. t, where q max maximizesM (q, t). The initial distribution of assets is uniform in [0, 4] . The steady state does not depend on the initial distribution of assets.
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